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THE CRISIS IN ARMS CONTROLt
Harold K. Jacobson*

There is general agreement among observers of contemporary international affairs, and national and international officials from all sides, that
there is a serious crisis in arms control. As of January 1984, the Soviet
Union had broken off two major arms control negotiations: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Talks (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START). Negotiations in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a variety of arms control issues were stalemated. The
United States was engaged in a large-scale military build up, and there was
no sig~ that the Soviet Union would abate the extensive military programs
that it had started in the 1960's; indeed, its leadership had declared that the
USSR would match U.S. efforts. Rhetorical exchanges between the United
States and the USSR were harsh. Each side had publicly accused the other
of violating existing arms control agreements. Since the signing of the limited nuclear weapon test ban treaty the prospects for arms control had never
appeared bleaker.
Analyses oftthe causes of the crisis abound. Few of these, however, penetrate the crisis' full potential depth. If the conceptual and political consensus which underlay the progress achieved in arms control starting in 1963
has evaporated, regaining the momentum in arms control will be more difficult than most observers have predicted.
How serious and long-lasting the crisis really is will be known only in
the future, but exploring its potential depth now may serve to foreclose the
worst possibilities. Portraying the possible destruction of the consensus,
and the cost of this, could serve to prevent it from occurring. This assumes
that the progress that has been achieved in the period since the conclusion
of World War II, and especially since 1963, should be valued, nurtured and
extended. Supporting this assumption, therefore, is a necessary preliminary
step to analyzing the crisis. Then it will be possible to explore why progress
has been possible and how the foundation of this progress may now be in
jeopardy.
I.

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT AND THE REGULATION OF
ARMAMENTS BEFORE 1945

A major reason that the post-World War II arms control accomplish-

t Earlier versions of this article were presented to seminars at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies, University of Geneva and the University of Bergen. I am grateful for
the comments made during the seminar discussions, for the constructive suggestions of my
colleagues at the Wilson Center, Peter Kruger and W.Y. Smith, and also for the research
assistance of Jeffrey Coleman, Lydia A. Enochs and Cindy Zimmerman.
* Jesse S. Reeves Professor of Political Science and Program Director, Center for Political
Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. B.A. 1950, University of Michigan; M.A. 1952; Ph.D. 1955, Yale University. - Ed.
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ments are so impressive is that so little had been accomplished previously,
despite the often widespread, deeply-felt desire to achieve disarmament, or
at least to regulate armaments. Of course, throughout history states that
were victorious in wars had imposed disarmament on their vanquished enemies. Efforts to achieve disarmament or the regulation of armaments
through negotiated agreements, however, had yielded few results.
The Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 between the United States and Britain limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes 1 was an exceptional achievement, all the more impressive because of its durability. During the period
between the two World Wars three treaties came into effect after being
signed and ratified - the Washington (1922) and London (1930) agreements limiting naval forces 2 and the Geneva Protocol (1925) prohibiting
the use of asphyxiating gases.3 Of these, only the last has endured. The
first two were of limited duration, and they have been sharply criticized for
endangering rather than contributing to international security. The League
of Nations' efforts to achieve disarmament, which were mandated by the
covenant and which culminated in the 1932 disarmament conference, failed
dismally.
At the end of the interwar period, there was broad agreement that the
regulation of armaments and a fortiori disarmament would be extremely
difficult to achieve through voluntary agreements.4 The negotiations conducted during the period had revealed seemingly insurmountable technical
and political obstacles.
The technical obstacle was the problem of comparability. It is most unlikely that states would voluntarily accept an agreement that significantly
altered the existing distribution among them of military power; they might,
however, accept an agreement that lowered the level of forces without altering the distribution of power. Even if this were not the case, states engaged
in a negotiation to regulate armaments would still be interested in assessing
the effects of potential agreements on the distribution of military power.
Under either assumption, different types of military forces would have to be
compared, because the structure of states' military forces differ
substantially.
With extensive and exposed land frontiers, the Soviet Union, following
traditional Russian patterns, has placed particular emphasis on land forces.
In the current era this has included heavy reliance on land-based, nucleartipped missiles. The United States, like Britain, has given greater emphasis
1. Rush-Bagot Agreement: Naval Forces on the American Lakes, Apr. 28, 1817, United
States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 231, 18 Stat. 296, T.S. No. 110 1/2.
2. International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Apr. 22,
1930, 46 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 830, 112 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as London Treaty]; Limitation of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No. 671, 25 L.N.T.S. 202 [hereinafter cited as Washington Treaty].
3. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 21 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No.
8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Protocol), reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
14 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS).
4. For analyses of these difficulties, see generally s. DE MADARIAGA, DISARMAMENT (2d
printing 1967); H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 391-416 (5th ed. 1973).
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to naval and air forces. Sea-launched ballistic missiles comprise a much
larger portion of U.S. strategic forces than they do of the USSR's strategic
forces. For the United States and the Soviet Union each to reduce their
forces by eliminating one Army or Marine division would lower the United
States' total of nineteen divisions by more than five percent while it would
lower the Soviet Union's total of 191 by less than one percent. Because of
the disproportionate effects of identical reductions, efforts have been made
to equate different elements of states' military forces, but this is an exceedingly difficult task. How many divisions should the Soviet Union drop to
counterbalance the United States giving up one aircraft carrier, an element
of military force in which the United States has numerical superiority?
Even if the League of Nations disarmament conference in 1932 had been
able to surmount the political obstacles on which it foundered, the preparatory work provided little ground for optimism that it would have been able
to devise cuts in military forces that states generally would have regarded as
comparable.
The political obstacles, however, proved insurmountable. First, there
was and is the issue of how states de.fine the military requirements for their
security. Simply put, states have military forces to provide for their security; they are unlikely to restrict or reduce their forces in ways that their
governments and public feel could jeopardize their security. In the early
1930's, France and Germany defined the basic requirements for their own
security in essentially incompatible terms. France insisted on having superiority in mobilized military forces, Germany sought military forces at least
approaching equality. This basic disagreement blocked any progress, and
as Germany cast off the limitations imposed on it by the Versailles settlement, no state forcefully objected.
Another political obstacle concerns the task of creating an international
organization which all parties could trust to monitor the agreement. It is
almost a condition of sovereignty that states will seek to create one type of
device or another to ensure that they can block an international organization from taking action against their interests; yet granting this protection
destroys the confidence that other states might have in the organization.
Complicated forms of majority voting have been considered, but none have
overcome this obstacle.
By World War II, disarmament and the regulation of armaments had
come to be seen from a considerably different perspective than that which
had led to the great emphasis on these objectives in the Covenant of the
League of Nations. The general belief that the failure of France and the
United Kingdom to have sufficient military forces to deter Germany contributed to the outbreak of World War II combined with an understanding
of the difficulties facing negotiated reductions, with the result that having
adequate military force available to defend the existing world order came to
be seen as a strategy for achieving peace at least equally as important as the
regulation of armaments and disarmaments. In 1945, governments and informed observers in the West were perhaps even more interested in the
availability of adequate military forces than they were in reducing them.
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ARMS CONTROL ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR

II

The devastating effect of nuclear weapons, demonstrated through their
use against Japan, forced reconsideration of these priorities; at a minimum,
it was thought, nuclear weapons should be controlled and preferably
banned and eliminated. Negotiations to control and eliminate nuclear
weapons were launched immediately, and after a time talks were also begun to limit conventional armaments. Even the horror of nuclear war,
tho?gh, was not a sufficient force to overcome the technical and political
obstacles that had blocked progress in the regulation of armaments during
the 1930's.5 As of the mid-1950's, both the Soviet Union and the United
States had substantial military establishments that included nuclear weapons as integrated components, the two Germanys had begun to rearm and
most of Europe was divided into opposing military alliances through the
North Atlantic and Warsaw treaties. This situation persisted through the
1960's and 1970's and continues into the 1980's. All of the major states
except Japan maintain military establishments that are large by peacetime
standards, and the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of
China have joined the United States and the USSR in developing nuclear
arsenals. India has detonated a nuclear device. How then is it possible to
argue that there have been important accomplishments in arms control in
the period since World War II?
One justification has already been given - compared to the interwar or
any period of comparable length many more arms control agreements have
been signed and ratified and have entered into force. Starting with the Antarctica treaty in 1959, the United States has signed twenty new bilateral and
multilateral treaties and agreements, fully accepting the five agreements,
ratifying twelve of the treaties and stating its intention to abide by the terms
of the three that it has not ratified. 6 In 1975, the United States finally ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In addition, the rearmament of the Federal
Republic of Germany has been controlled through the 1954 treaty that established the Western European Union (WEU).7 That so many agreements
have been voluntarily negotiated and put into effect is notable.
A more important justification to support the argument that there have
been important accomplishments in arms control in the period since World
War II, is that these negotiated agreements have had significant beneficial
consequences in controlling armaments. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if Israel and South Africa are added to the six states listed above,
is much less extensive than anyone as recently as two decades ago predicted
it would be. Surely the several treaties that constitute the nonproliferation
regime have contributed to this outcome. The Federal Republic of Germany renounced the right to produce or possess nuclear weapons in the
WEU treaty; more than ninety states have, acceded to this restriction by
accepting the 1968 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 8 The
5. An excellent account of the arms control negotiations is provided in B. BECHHOEFFER,
POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1961).
6. The texts of these treaties and a statement of their status can be found in DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra note 3.
7. WEU Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342.
8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July I, 1968,
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limited test ban treaty, which only permits the testing of nuclear weapons
underground, precludes all signatories from testing such weapons except
the small number that have large territories which include sparsely inhabited areas. 9 The 1967 Treaty of Tlaltelolco declared Latin America a nuclear-free zone. 10 The WEU treaty, the Treaty of Tlaltelolco and the
International Atomic Energy Agency all established inspection mechanisms
to provide reassurance that nuclear materials dedicated to peaceful purposes are not diverted to use in the fabrication of weapons. To be sure, the
nonproliferation regime did not stop India from detonating a nuclear device in 1974, and it will not necessarily prevent additional states from gaining a nuclear weapons capability. It has, however, sharply limited the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It could continue to do this.
The arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union
has been subjected to restraints. Because of the limited test ban treaty,
neither country has tested nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer
space or under water since 1963. This has eliminated a major environmental hazard. It has also meant that neither side can have complete confidence in an anti-ballistic missile system that uses nuclear warheads because
such systems have never been tested in flight and cannot be by states adhering to the treaty. Because of the treaties, the United States and the Soviet
Union have been precluded from deploying nuclear weapons in Antarctica,
in outer space and on the deep seabed. They have agreed to respect the
nuclear-free character of Latin America. Under the nonproliferation treaty
they may not transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to
non-nuclear-weapon states. Under the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty
and protocol, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed not to
deploy more than one ABM system. 11 Numerical limits have been set on
the strategic arsenals of the two sides as a consequence of the interim agreement and the treaty negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
(SALT). 12 Although these agreements, with the exception of the ABM protocol, did not lead to a reduction in United States and Soviet armaments,
they have prevented the two countries from adopting policies involving the
21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,

supra note 3, at 91.
9. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, openedfar signature Aug. S, 1963, 14 U.N.T.S. 334 [hereinafter cited as Limited Test
Ban Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 41.
10. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 64.
11. Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,)uly 3, 1974,
United States-Soviet Union, art. I, 27 U.S.T. 164S, 1648, T.I.A.S. No. 8276, reprinted in DIS•
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,supra note 3, at 162; Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, art. III, 23 U.S.T. 343S, 3440, T.I.A.S.
No. 7S03 [hereinafter cited 115 the ABM Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 3, at 139.
12. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, United Slates•
Soviet Union, S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 [hereinafter cited as SALT II
Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 246; Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972,
United States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter cited as SALT I
Interim Agreement], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at ISO.
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further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. The nuclear
arsenals of the two countries could have become even more formidable.
Other agreements have involved measures designed to lessen the risk
that the United States and the Soviet Union will unintentionally become
involved in a nuclear exchange, and more broadly to stabilize the military
relationship between the two countries. Means to insure rapid and accurate
communication between the heads of government of the two countries have
been put in place. 13 The two countries have agreed to take measures to
prevent accidents with nuclear weapons and to insure against their unauthorized use. 14 They have pledged to consult each other in the event of
third-party conflicts that might escalate and involve them. I 5
More importantly, as a consequence of the ABM treaty and protocol
and the limited nuclear test ban treaty, the two countries have left themselves vulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear strike. This vulnerability is a powerful deterrent against either side launching a nuclear attack against the
other: neither the government of the United States nor that of the Soviet
Union seems likely to initiate an action that would surely subject its own
society to unprecedented devastation.
In sum, the arms control agreements have limited the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, put restraints on the development of nuclear weapons,
limited the places where nuclear weapons can be deployed, created safeguards against the unintentional use of nuclear weapons and, by leaving the
Soviet Union and the United States vulnerable to each other, created a
strong deterrent against either country using nuclear weapons. Nuclear
arsenals have been controlled; the term "arms control" accurately describes
the process and its goals, more so than traditional terms such as "disarmament" and the "regulation" of armaments. The agreements do not make
the world safe, but they make it safer than it would be without them. Further agreements could be negotiated that would make it even safer. These
agreements will not be achieved, however, unless the current crisis in arms
control is overcome, and failure to make further progress could place at risk
what has already been accomplished.
Ill.

THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AS A PROTOTYPE FOR
PROGRESS IN .ARMS CONTROL

The forbidding aspect of the current crisis is that the conceptual and
political consensus that was thought to underlie the progress in arms control
may have evaporated. This apparent consensus was forged in the negotia13. See Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications
Link, Sept. 30, 1971, United States-Soviet "Qnion, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187, reprinted
in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 115; Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, July 20, 1963, United StatesSoviet Union, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 3, at 31.
14. See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept.
30, 1971, United States-Soviet Union, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. 7186, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 111.
15. See Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, United States-Soviet
Union, art. IV, 24 U.N.T.S. 1478, T.I.A.S. No. 7654, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 3, at 159.
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tions that led to the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The limited test ban
treaty became a prototype for other treaties limiting nuclear weapons. Understanding it, and the full context of its negotiation and acceptance, is crucial to understanding the progress that has been achieved and also the
current crisis. 16
The treaty is very simple. It consists of a preamble and five articles.
The first article states the basic obligation not to test nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere, in outer space or under water. The second article provides a
mechanism for amending the treaty. The third article states the conditions
for the treaty to enter into effect and for states other than the three original
parties, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and
the United States, to accede to the treaty. According to the fourth article,
the treaty is of unlimited duration, except that a party may withdraw by
giving three months notice "if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country." 17 The final article makes the English and Russian texts
"equally authentic."
Several observations are in order. First, the treaty avoided the technical
problem of comparability by not requiring states to reduce their military
forces, but simply requiring them to desist from further testing of nuclear
weapons. Of course, the ban on testing would affect the Soviet Union and
the United States in different ways since the two countries had pursued
testing programs that emphasized different types of weapons: the Soviet
Union had done more testing of weapons with large yields - the type of
testing that could not be conducted underground - than the United States.
There was no effort, however, to include in the treaty a provision that
would equate the technical progress of the two sides. Instead, by simply
precluding all but underground testing, governments were left to determine
whether it would be in their interests to adhere to the limited ban, and to
take whatever compensatory measures they might feel would be appropriate through underground testing or some _other means.
Second, the treaty avoided the political problem of diminishing the felt
security of any of the original parties because it did not require them to
reduce their military forces, but merely to desist from further development,
a course that could have made one or all of the original parties feel even
more insecure.
The treaty avoided the political problem of attempting to create an international institution that all parties could trust to serve as a control mechanism for the agreement, by relying instead on national technical means
(NTMs) for monitoring compliance. Until the signing of the limited test
ban treaty, from as far back as the end of World War I, it had generally
been assumed that agreements for the regulation of armaments would necessarily involve the creation of international institutions that would be responsible for monitoring compliance with the agreements and for imposing
16. This analysis draws heavily on the work that Eric Stein and I did for our book D1PLO·
MATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
NEGOTIATIONS (1966).
17. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.
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sanctions if there were infractions. 18 Failure to agree on the decision-making procedures of such an institution had been one of the major reasons the
early negotiations to control nuclear weapons had foundered. In 1963, although the negotiations to ban nuclear weapons tests had been in progress
for five years, major issues concerning the international organization that
would police the agreement remained unresolved, and it was not at all certain that agreement would be possible. The conclusion that all but underground tests could be adequately monitored by NTMs meant that these
controversies could be sidestepped.
The issue of imposing sanctions if a party to the agreement were to
break it was also avoided. The only provision in the treaty relating to the
issue of sanctions is article 4, which allows parties to withdraw by giving
three months' notice. This provision recognized that the only real sanction
if one party were to break the agreement would be for the other side to
resume testing. The article recognized that at least three months would be
required to mount a retaliatory test series; thus, giving three months' notice
to withdraw would not impose a liability or inhibition on a wronged party.
The control mechanism for the limited test ban treaty thus consists of
national technical means as the method of surveillance and adversary retaliatory testing as the sanction for a breach of the agreement. Allowing continued testing of nuclear weapons underground was related to both aspects.
Rightly or wrongly, U.S. officials concluded that national technical means
would not provide adequate surveillance of underground testing. U.S. officials also concluded that for the threat of retaliatory testing to be credible,
U.S. weapons laboratories would have to maintain active programs. They
felt that this would be difficult unless some weapons could be tested; good
scientists would be unwilling to work on projects that could never be
brought to the stage of actual testing.
Maintaining a credible deterrent was an important issue because on
September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons that had been in effect since the negotiations began in 1958
by launching the most extensive series of tests ever conducted, a series that
would involve the most destructive weapons ever tested. In December,
1959, President Eisenhower had stated that because of lack of progress in
the negotiations, the United States would consider itself free to resume testing, although it would not do so without announcing its intention in advance of any resumption. The -United States did not prepare for a new
series ohests in the atmosphere, however, so that it was April 1962 before it
began a retaliatory test series. Many U.S. government officials felt that unless the Unitefi States maintained a capacity to test, the USSR might again
unexpectedly test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. As it was, the Soviet
Union conducted another series of tests in December 1962, and thus was
the last of the original parties to the limited ban treaty to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union's test series in 1961 and 1962
18. It should be noted, however, that neither the Washington Treaty, supra note 3, nor the
London Treaty, supra note 2, regulating naval armaments provided for inspection or enforcement mechanisms. The types of naval vessels that were regulated probably could not have
been constructed in secret. In this sense, the Washington and London Treaties are forerunners of the post-World War II treaties that rely on national technical means for verification.
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were conducted despite the decree that the Supreme Soviet adopted on
March 31, 1958, resolving to discontinue all types of nuclear weapons tests.
On several occasions during the debate in the United States on the ratification of the limited test ban treaty, the Kennedy administration gave assurances that as a deterrent against the USSR's breaking the treaty, the United
States would maintain a readiness to resume testing of nuclear weapons in
the atmosphere.
Although various individuals and groups in the United States found the
limited test ban treaty less than completely satisfactory from their point of
view, it nevertheless commanded widespread support. Those who were primarily interested in achieving the regulation of armaments, and ultimately
disarmament, would have preferred a comprehensive test ban. Some military officials and scientists, particularly those associated with the Lawrence
laboratory at Livermore, California, worried that the treaty would place the
United States at a military disadvantage. The Soviet Union was using
high-yield warheads to compensate for the fact that the guidance systems
for its missiles were not as accurate as the U.S. systems. It was foreseeable
that when the USSR caught up with the United States in this respect (and it
has) its advantage in high-yield weapons would continue to exist and the
United States' compensating advantage would have disappeared. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, collectively and individually supported the ratification of the treaty. It should be noted, though, that the limited nuclear
test ban treaty was negotiated at a time when the United States was engaged in extensive build up of its military forces; the Joint Chiefs had ample reason to believe that whatever military disadvantages the treaty might
involve, compensating actions would be taken. An overwhelming majority
of other U.S. officials also supported ratification of the treaty. Whatever
reservations individuals and groups may have had about the treaty there
was broad consensus that the United States and the world were better off
with the treaty than they would be without it.
On September 24, 1963, the U.S. Senate voted eighty to nineteen to give
its advice and consent to the ratification of the limited test ban treaty, and
the following day the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously voted to ratify it. The international consensus appeared to be
sealed.
The nuclear test ban treaty is an important measure of arms control. To
reiterate its benefits, it protects the atmosphere against environmental degradation, it is an important instrument against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and it is an inhibition against the development of some types of
ABM systems.
Subsequent arms control agreements have been modeled on the limited
nuclear test ban treaty. They have usually not involved reducing military
forces in being, but rather renouncing possible actions that have not yet
been taken. Progress has been limited and incremental. When the treaties
have involved the military establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union, the agreements have relied on NTMs for surveillance of compliance with the terms of the agreements and on the possibility of adversary
retaliation as a potential sanction against failure to comply. Only the treaties that comprise the nonproliferation regime provide for control mecha-
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nisms operated by international institutions, and these have only limited
and voluntary application to the nuclear-weapon states.
IV.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CRISIS

Until the mid-1970's, it seemed that the apparent consensus forged
within the United States and between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the negotiations that led to the limited nuclear test ban treaty, and
the model of the treaty, could provide the impulse for continued progress in
arms control for many years to come. How has this prospect been called
into question?
In the United States, arms control has become a political issue. Both
Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 attacked the arms control record of the incumbent president as important parts of their presidential campaigns. Carter and Reagan each, rather than promising to build on
the achievements of his predecessor, pledged to demonstrate a new approach. Carter initiated the process of making arms control a political issue
by arguing that President Ford had not done enough to reduce armaments,
especially nuclear weapons.
The administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford had taken steps
to extend the limited ban on nuclear testing to include some underground
testing and to place a quantitative limit on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces. In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty that
prohibited conducting underground nuclear explosions with a yield of more
than 150 kilotons; all nuclear explosions in any other environment were
already prohibited by the limited test ban treaty. 19 Under the protocol to
the treaty the two sides agreed to exchange information on the yields of
weapons tested at their underground sites, as well as geophysical data concerning these sites to facilitate the calibration of the other parties' seismic
instruments - in other words, to facilitate detection by NTMs. Two years
later, in 1976, the two countries signed a treaty that would allow the conducting of underground peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) at sites other
than those on which information had been exchanged under the terms of
the threshold test ban treaty; explosions could be conducted at such sites,
however, only under conditions that provided for on-site inspections.20
Control of PNEs is essential because there is no basic difference between
the technology of a PNE and of a nuclear weapon.
The U.S. government had never been wholly confident, especially with
respect to explosions having lower yields, that, relying solely on national
technical means, it could distinguish underground nuclear explosions from
earthquakes. For this reason, from the outset of the negotiations to ban
nuclear testing, the United States had insisted that if underground testing
were to be prohibited, the agreement would have to provide for on-site inspections so that suspicious seismic events could be investigated. The So19. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, July 3, 1974, art. I,
United States-Soviet Union, S. Exec. Doc. No. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in DIS•
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 167.
20. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, arts.
3, 4, United States-Soviet Union, S. Exec. Doc. No. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12, reprinted in
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 173.
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viet Union, on the other hand, was very reluctant to allow on-site
inspections. The two treaties were steps toward breaking this impasse. In
the 1974 agreement the United States acknowledged that it could have reasonable confidence in its ability to detect underground tests of nuclear
weapons that had a yield of more than 150 kilotons. By allowing on-site
inspections in the 1976 treaty, the Soviet Union acknowledged that they
might be necessary. Experience with on-site inspections could show how
essential they really were, or might make them less essential by allowing the
confirmation and calibration of national technical means of detection. Experience could also provide a test for the USSR of how intrusive they might
be.
The two treaties could be seen as forerunners of a comprehensive ban
on testing nuclear weapons. There has always been opposition in the U.S.
government, however, to a comprehensive test ban (CTB), irrespective of
the U.S.'s ability to monitor compliance with such an agreement. This opposition is based on a desire to improve the efficiency and safety of weapons, to maintain a testing capability as a deterrent against the limited test
ban being broken and to proof-test weapons to insure that they continue to
function properly after many years of storage. This opposition would have
to be overcome for the United States to agree to a comprehensive test ban.
In 1972, as part of the SALT negotiations, the United States and the
Soviet Union signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive
Weapons.21 This agreement committed the two sides for a period of five
years not to deploy strategic ballistic missile launchers beyond those that
were already deployed or under construction. This interim agreement was
to be the first step toward a more permanent and far-reaching limitation of
the two sides' strategic nuclear arms. Negotiations proceeded toward this
objective, and in 1974 at Vladivostok President Gerald Ford and Chairman
Leonid Brezhnev agreed that the prospective treaty should limit each of the
two sides to 2,400 launchers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, no more
than 1,320 of which should be launchers for missiles with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The United States had sought
but failed to win Soviet agreement for a lower number that could have
required the USSR to reduce its modem heavy intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) force. The Soviet Union would have had to reduce the
number of its launchers only slightly to comply with the 2,400 ceiling while
the United States could have increased the number of its launchers. The
Ford administration saw the Vladivostok agreement as an important step
toward achieving a strategic arms limitation treaty. It also regarded the
equal ceilings as an improvement over the U.S. inferiority imposed by the
Interim Agreement. Although the goal of achieving a strategic arms limitation treaty was of some urgency because the Interim Agreement would expire in 1977, it had not been gained by the time of the 1976 presidential
campaign.
During the campaign, Jimmy Carter attacked the underground threshold test ban treaty and the entire concept of peaceful nuclear explosions,
and argued that what was needed was a comprehensive test ban. He also
attacked the Vladivostok numerical ceilings, arguing that they were too
21. SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note 12.
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high and would allow an arms build up rather than providing arms control.
He pledged to reduce the defense budget $5 to $7 billion below the planned
figure.
After his election, President Carter did not press the Senate to give its
advice and consent to the two treaties dealing with underground nuclear
explosions, but instead sought to achieve a comprehensive test ban. By the
end of his administration, agreement had not been reached on a CTB, and
the two treaties remained unratified.
With respect to the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, in the early days
of his administration, Carter decided to try to press for ceilings that were
lower than those agreed to at Vladivostok: he proposed a total number of
launchers between 1,800 and 2,000 of which only 1,100 or 1,200 could have
MIRVs. These ceilings would have required the USSR to reduce the
number of strategic nuclear launchers that it had by almost twenty-five percent; the U.S. reduction would have been less than five percent. The USSR
rejected Carter's proposal. When the SALT treaty was finally signed in
June 1979 the initial ceilings set for strategic nuclear weapon launchers
were 2,400, of which only 1,320 could be missiles with MIRVs, exactly the
ceilings that had been argued on at Vladivostok. 22 The treaty did provide,
however, that as of January 1, 1982, the overall ceiling would be lowered to
2,250. Carter submitted the treaty to the Senate to gain its advice and consent to ratification, but on January 3, 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he asked the Senate to defer consideration of the treaty.
Whether or not the Senate would have given its consent to ratification of
the SALT treaty had the Soviet Union not invaded Afghanistan is moot.
Both liberals and conservatives in the Senate attacked the treaty because
the ceilings that it set were too high; they did not do enough to reduce the
number of nuclear weapons. The liberals simply wanted the total reduced;
the conservatives particularly wanted the USSR to reduce the number of
heavy missiles that it had deployed, missiles which the conservatives believed threatened the U.S. ICBM force. The conservatives also questioned
whether the treaty could be verified adequately. Furthermore, they were
skeptical of the wisdom of entering into an arms control agreement with the
Soviet Union when it was engaged - in their eyes - in conduct that
threatened U.S. interests in the Third World, and when the United States
was not doing enough to ensure the adequacy of its own military forces. In
constant dollars the military budgets for fiscal year 1978, which began October l, 1977 and which was the first full year of the Carter Presidency, and
for fiscal year 1979 were less than the budget for fiscal year 1977, even
though in current dollars they were larger. Inflation more than absorbed
the increase. The military budget for fiscal year 1980 - again in constant
dollars - was less than one percent higher than that for fiscal year 1977.
As president, Carter thus essentially fulfilled his campaign pledge to cut the
military budget.
During the 1980 presidential campaign Ronald Reagan asserted that the
SALT treaty was "fatally flawed," because, among other reasons, it did not
provide for significant reductions. He pledged to build up U.S. military
22. SALT II Treaty, supra note 12, arts. III, IV.
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forces, arguing that this would induce the Soviet Union to accept sharp
reductions in nuclear forces. When he became president, Reagan began an
extensive military build up: The military budgets for fiscal years 1981 and
1982 were each more than eleven percent larger in constant dollars than
that of the preceding year, and that for fiscal year 1983 was almost nine
percent larger. Although President Reagan announced that the United
States would abide by the terms of the SALT treaty as long as the Soviet
Union did too, he refused to press for ratification of the treaty. He renamed
the SALT negotiations the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and
sought deep reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals.
In 1982 he broke off the talks concerning a comprehensive test ban and
announced that he would not press for ratification of the threshold test ban
and PNE treaties unless they were improved, specifically by greater provision for on-site inspections, but the Soviet Union refused to reopen the
negotiations.
Carter's and Reagan's actions symbolize a broad politicization within
the United States of arms control issues; these issues have become a matter
of partisan controversy. Moreover, the course that was pursued from the
signing of the limited test ban treaty through the PNE agreement has come
under attack from both ends of the political spectrum. With respect to strategic weapons, both left and right argue that much lower ceilings than those
provided for in the SALT treaty are necessary. With respect to underground testing and PNE, in contrast, the two sides differ sharply: the left is
determined to achieve a comprehensive test ban, while the right would
abandon efforts to control underground explosions. The sharpness of the
debate about arms control and the failure of the Senate to give its advice
and consent to the ratification of the three treaties puts in question the ability of the United States to ratify any treaty.
Of course, a treaty involving deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals
of the United States and the Soviet Union which did not weaken the U.S.
sense of security would be very welcome to Americans of virtually all political persuasions. The problem is that to negotiate such a treaty the two
sides would have to address and surmount the technical problem of comparability, the problem that plagued negotiations prior to 1963. The strategic
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States have quite different structures; to reduce them sharply without seriously disadvantaging one
side or the other would be extremely difficult.
Further dimmine the prospects for arms control, it is not clear now that
the United States and the Soviet Union hold the same concept of the goals
of the process that began in 1963 with the limited nuclear test ban treaty.
The apparent consensus between the two states may have been short-lived
or even illusory. To be sure, the United States and the Soviet Union continue to agree on the modalities embodied in the limited nuclear test ban
treaty; reliance on NTMs for surveillance and the possibility of adversary
retaliation as the potential sanction against infractions. The two countries
seem, however, to have had different expectations about the broader consequences of a series of agreements based on these modalities.
There has been a widespread expectation in the United States that as
more and more arms control agreements came into effect, the arms race
between the Soviet Union and the United States would be slowed and ultimately reversed. Furthermore, there was also a general expectation that as
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the military relationship between the two countries was stabilized and made
less tense, their propensity to clash throughout the world would be
moderated.
Starting with the seven-year plan that began in 1959, the USSR's military expenditures have risen steadily, resulting in a continual and substantial military build up. 23 Rather than stopping the deployment of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles when it achieved numerical parity with the United
States, as many Americans expected would happen, the Soviet Union continued to deploy more and more weapons until ceilings were set by the
Interim Agreement and the SALT treaty. Modernization of weapons continued within the framework of these ceilings, and there has been increased
deployment of weapons not covered by them. Serious allegations have
been raised that the Soviet Union has violated other arms control agreements, the first two of which it has ratified: the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods ofWarfare;24 the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile systems;25 and the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms. 26 Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union has
abetted and given substantial material assistance to forces that threatened
Westem interests in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and Central
America.
It seems clear from the pronouncements of Soviet leaders that the USSR
never intended by engaging in the arms control process to limit its freedom
to support what it viewed as revolutionary forces in the Third World. To
accept such a limitation would involve the USSR's renouncing its commitment to support what it views as the progressive movement of history. This
poses in acute terms the issue of linkage - to what extent should the
United States make its agreement to arms control measures conditional on
Soviet restraint in the Third World. This issue did not arise at the time of
the signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, nor for about a decade
thereafter, but it cannot be avoided in the 1980's. In many ways the issue is
similar to one faced in the interwar period and specifically at the League of
Nations disarmament conference - can arms control be achieved in the
absence of a political agreement or must a political agreement precede the
acceptance of arms control?
It also seems clear that the Soviet Union will not willingly accept a military position that it perceives as being inferior to the United States. The
purpose of the Soviet military build up is difficult to fathom, at least partly
because of the degree of secrecy in which the USSR enshrouds its military
affairs. Given this basic uncertainty, it is hard to understand fully how the
Soviet Union conceived that arms control would serve its interests. Did it
see arms control as a way of freezing situations where it had a military
advantage, or as blocking United States weapons developments so that it
could catch up, as some Americans have alleged, or did it see it as a more
neutral device for stabilizing dangerous relationships? Does the USSR rer
23. This arms build up is described and analyzed in D. HOLLOWAY, THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE ARMS RACE (1983).
24. Geneva Protocol, supra note 3.
25. ABM Treaty, supra note 11.
26. SALT II Treaty, supra note 12.
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gard its having anything less than military superiority as putting it in a
position of inferiority?
The inability to answer these questions with certainty contributes to the
tendency in the United States to seek deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. Given the Soviet insistence on not being placed in
a position that it would regard as involving military inferiority and U.S.
suspicion about Soviet intentions, the technical problem of comparability
will inescapably be a central issue in any negotiation aimed at achieving
substantial reductions.
If an agreement provided for substantial reductions, infractions would
have more serious military consequences than if the parties' arsenals were
larger. Thus, verification is a more serious issue in negotiations aimed at
deep cuts. Suspicion that the Soviet Union has violated existing arms control agreements has already raised the demands for certainty that the
United States places on verification systems. Moreover, the evolving weapons technology has substantially increased the difficulty of verifying arms
control agreements. Cruise missiles, which the United States has started to
deploy and which the Soviet Union is developing, can carry either nuclear
or conventional warheads. They are small and mobile and easy to conceal.
All of these factors throw into question the adequacy of nonintrusive national technical means - essentially observation satellites - to monitor
future arms control agreements. If NTMs are not adequate, then more
elaborate verification systems, perhaps under international control, will be
required. Unfortunately, devising such systems has generally eluded negotiators aiming toward the regulation of armaments or disarmament.
V.

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

What then are the prospects for arms control? If the apparent consensus
that made possible the limited nuclear test ban treaty and the several treaties and agreements that followed it has evaporated, they are indeed bleak,
because progress in arms control would require overcoming obstacles that
before 1963 consistently blocked the achievement of agreements.
Perhaps these obstacles can be overcome. Public revulsion against nuclear weapons seems greater than it ever has been. President Reagan and
the U.S. Catholic bishops agree that the current situation - in which the
ultimate guarantee against either side launching a first strike is the fact that
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could escape a massive retaliatory nuclear strike - is not in the long run an acceptable way of dealing with nuclear weapons. The nuclear freeze movement has gathered
unprecedented popular support in the United States and the West. There
are indications of stirrings of opposition to nuclear weapons in communist
countries as well. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, however, public
opposition to them has risen, crested and dropped back. Whether or not the
current tide of opposition will provide sufficient pressure to force governments to overcome the traditional obstacles to the regulation of armaments
and disarmaments is impossible to predict.
Failing this, another possible course would be to attempt to return to the
concepts that made possible the limited nuclear test ban treaty and the subsequent agreements and treaties. It is a much less satisfying path, for it
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involves incremental, rather than dramatic, progress and living with, rather
than eliminating, nuclear weapons. The United States would have to accept arms control as primarily a device for reducing the risk of nuclear and
possibly conventional conflict, not as a brake on Soviet expenditures. The
United States may no longer find this an attractive prospect; yet if the traditional obstacles cannot be overcome, the only other course could be an expensive and dangerous arms race.

